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-Abstract 
Is Anglo-American contract law based on promise as its ethical basis? Fried in his 
book Contract as Promise argues that indeed contract is based on promise, and he 
proceeds to show how the various areas of contract law such as acceptance, agreement, 
bargain, are analogous to the framework of the ethics of promise. Atiyah, along with 
others, finds fault in this. In particular, Atiyah examines detrimental reliance as proof that 
the moral underpinnings of contract law extend beyond promise into social and economic 
considerations. Atiyah's side seems to complicate Fried's position. However, if one is 
willing to become more Friedian than Fried and to utilize a more extensive definition of 
promise, such as Melden's, Fried's case retains coherence. However, does this definition 
become too cumbersome for common understanding? Can such distinction be held onto 
as an absolute starting point for law? What is mechanism and what is principled ruling? 
There is an epilogue to this first polemic. The questions of linguistic order and 
the development of contract are further discussed. The epilogue is in a much different 
spirit than the central argument. Instead of careful discussion of philosophers, it intends 
to paint, by broad strokes, a picture, as Faust does, into the troubling and problematic 
notion of promise and self in modernity. This is at the same time a tributary of thought 
from the main argument and a meta-questioning of the ideals upon which that this essay 
is grounded. 
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Suppose the following cases. 
Harold, an automobile designer, is contracted by Track Motors to design a new sports 
car. Harold agrees also to provide supervision over its construction in the assembly line to ensure 
that the design is followed accurately. The agreement between them is that Harold will receive 
10% of the manufacturing costs for the first year of production, projected as $250,000, as 
payment for his services of design and supervision. 
(l) Suppose that Track Motors repudiates the agreement with Harold and hires Phil as a 
substitute designer. Track Motors communicates this to Harold before Harold begins work on the 
plans. To what damages is Harold entitled? 
(2) Suppose that Harold has completed 60% of his design work, but has not yet began 
any construction or supervision of the assembly line when the owner communicates the same 
repudiation of the contract. Harold has already received $50,000 as a down paymf:nt towards his 
fees. To what damages is Harold entitled? 
(3) Suppose that Harold is completely finished with his end of the bargain but Track 
Motors refuses to pay the last $100,000 due Harold under the contract. To what damages is 
Harold entitled? 
How one addresses these cases and to what remedies one would ascribe to each is based 
on a combination of intuition and principled rationale. But which reasoning is more natural? To 
which does contract law "actually" attribute as its basis? Some may say that a promise is an 
absolute principle that society must guard even when the repercussions are not comfortable, 
because the idea of promise is fundamental to numerous transactions in modem social 
intercourse. Others would argue solely on the basis of damages sustained or wrongful benefits 
occurred, and all the facets that are therein contained. This problem was first set out so as to 
bring the case to a clear confrontation, for the distinctions in these cases are such that depending 
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on the principles one is using, the answers will waiver greatly. This is the ideological interplay 
that serves as the point of tension for the rest of the paper. 
Beginnings and Goals 
What issues should a court consider essential when trying to find a ruling on issues 
dealing with contract law? Charles Fried has argued that promise gives contract its most 
substantial moral force. He sees contract la"v as being concretely based upon a promise between 
two autonomous individuals; and, as long as basic issues of offer, acceptance, good faith, duress, 
bargain, and unconscionability are duly satisfied, the court should always rule in respect to that 
promise in accordance to the wills of the parties. On the other hand, P.S. Atiyah would persuade 
one to look at issues such as reliance on the offer and social policy in relation to court rulings. 
After such an exploration, Atiyah believes that the end would result in an explication that contract 
law does not begin and end with a promise. Rather, the base and development of contract is 
contained more in social contract theory. Other legal and philosophical minds have argued a 
more pragmatic approach, putting more stress on a consequentialist sort of reasoning. Others, 
like Howard Kahane, have attributed Contract Ethics to a moral sentiment as developed on an 
evolutionary biological basis (Kahane 42). Others still have said that contract law has a stronger 
basis in ideas of fairness, detrimental reliance, or economic efficiency. 
There then lies a heavy burden of proof for Fried to show that what actually happens in 
contract law rulings are somehow generated and consistent with promise as contract. Can the 
features of the morality of promise explain contract law fully? Do the fundamental issues of 
contract law such as consideration, offer, acceptance, approaches to remedies, unconscionability, 
agreement, and unilateral misunderstanding find grounding in promise? Where does a moral 
basis for law end and pragmatic or institutional considerations begin? It is in these issues that 
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several of these rationales cross paths, and their different implications must be more clearly 
observed, delineated, and differentiated. All of these questions must be asked in all seriousness to 
see if promise is really the moral basis for contract law, and that is where this paper shall begin. 
I. Discussion of Fried's Liberal Ideal as Contract's Moral 
Underpinnings 
It is curious that simply by saying "I promise to do X" one would create upon oneself a 
moral obligation to X. Is that pressure of obligation coming from within or outside of oneself? 
This is a central question in dealing with the question of promise as contract. If thIS obligation 
comes from within, it is evidence of a sentiment to be in the "right" above and beyond social ties. 
It is a will to be consistent in one's word and future deed. Probably, one would freely 
acknowledge such an urge for integrity, such a pursuit of trust. But another question ensues: Was 
this search for trust for trust's sake really an abstraction that finds its original roots in social 
contract as a response to environmental pressures? If this is the case, then that pressure original 
intentions would come from the outside despite what one might prima facia intuit one's 
motivations to be. And so begins the debate the ethics of promise. 
In order to understand Fried's position on contract as promise, one must first be familiar 
with Fried's grounding in his interpretation of the "liberal ideal." Simply put, this liberal ideal 
states that all human beings are free to proceed in their projects, and in those projects all objects 
of the universe are acceptable for use. However, other agents also have that freedom. Morality, 
then, requires one, out of an understanding of one's own autonomy, to respect other moral agents 
in their personhood as well as property, leaving them to their respective deserved liberty. This 
ideal demands that one's achievements are absolutely one's own, and they include both successes 
and failures. That ownership is necessitated by the Kantian idea of the lawgiver's autonomy. By 
defining oneself as self-determining, one gives oneself to a certain number of mOTa I obligations: 
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the most primary, being that of a responsibility in choices as a result ofthat freedom. This 
responsibility relates to consequences from one's actions on one's own projects as well as on the 
projects of others. Humankind is societal by nature. In order to form a society, humans must be 
able to engage and share in projects with others. The only way this can be done is to provide 
one's rights in exchange for another's rights. I will give you my right to a portion of the rhubarb 
I grew in exchange for your right to a certain portion of the ants in your sandbox. Such is the 
convention ofa promise, and it is consecrated by an element of trust often symbolized by a hearty 
handshake. Humans do things cooperatively to function as a society, and this cooperation is 
expressed most palpably in the form of a promise. 
With this "liberal ideal" in mind, it can be more clearly understood what exactly happens 
when individual A makes a promise to individual B. First, it is apparent that a promise is 
something that is communicated, thereby demonstrating the intrinsic social nature of a promise. 
Second, this promise is an obligation created, that is to sayan obligation that did not previously 
exist. The promise is self-imposed. Third, a promise now places a moral charge on a future act. 
(That is, a promise of a future action as opposed to a promise of the state of current affairs. After 
all, a promise-to-act is more than just truthfully reporting one's present intentions, for one may be 
free to change one's mind. But one is not free to break one's promise without moral 
ramifications.) Fourth, a promise invokes a convention whose function it is to give moral 
grounds to expect the promised performance. When promising, one invokes trust and creates 
expectations in others, and the promisor intends the promisee to rely upon and trust in that 
promise. One now has a duty just because one could have seen (indeed it was one's intention) 
that the promisee would rely on that promise, and that they would suffer if that action were not 
enacted. Fifth, both parties involved were disposing their rights as seen best fit. This is both their 
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freedom and responsibility as moral agents. They willingly mitigated part oftheir autonomy and 
freedom in exchange for some other benefit. I 
Humans are, however, a society whose aspirations often depend on future actions. Very 
few human interactions are an immediate exchange. For example, A wants to accomplish 
purpose L, and B wants to accomplish purpose M. Neither can exceed without the cooperation of 
the other over a certain period of time. Thus A wants to be able to commit herself to help B 
achieve M so that B will commit himself to helping A achieve L. IfL and M could be transferred 
immediately, then a simple promise would suffice, and there would be no need for commitment. 
But again this is rarely the case. A device that permits a trade by promise to extend over time is 
required, and that device is contract. 
Thus, in understanding contract law, one must understand it in terms of obligation, for to 
break that obligation constitutes the wrongful taking of another's autonomy. So, if contract law is 
to be based in and on promise, the relief must be measured by an expectation of duties to be 
preformed coupled with what is necessitated to make that person whole again. Fried admits that 
this cannot be done when contract finds its grounding in something else. Thus Fried must hold 
tightly to keeping people honest to their promises even in the face of unpleasant circumstances. 
If a promisor is not held to her obligation, and if she is not allowed to take responsibility, then in 
effect her personhood is being mitigated. She is not taken seriously as a person. Promise as 
contract rests on the traditional liberal value of free choice as free agents. So long as they are 
I The promise in ethics and the contract in law are peculiar in respect to other institutions and conventions 
in that they always extend to the future. Othenvise, ethics and law restrain themselves to the analysis of the 
past with conclusions about X, which would then imply recommendations as to future action, but no 
further. As it is that the promise binds one to future action, the element of continuit}, over time must be 
examined. It must be assumed that the "I" that made the promise today will be the same ''1'' that acts upon 
the promise in three weeks or three years or whatever time element is relevant How do I know that the 
future ''1'' will approve? Intentions, both hidden and communicated now and in the future, now take a 
second place to prime importance of responsibiIit}' to carry through on that thing. I am in effect tmding the 
interest of my future self for the interests of my present self. This becomes complicated, but adheres again 
to the idea that in human nature there is a certain will or assumption that we are and will Ix: somehow 
coherent and ex--periencing a sense of integrity \\ithin ourselves. 
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-"free" and enter into contracts "willingly," they are capable of acting on their intentions; they 
incur a responsibility and are culpable to deliver their side of the bargain. 
II. What Fried Says 
Is a promise made every time the word promise is used? The delineation of some 
common characteristics to promissory ethics will prove useful. One can say that when S 
promises P to action T, she is actually ... for the moment, let's stop right there. Notice already 
that fundamental to the idea of promise is the conception of a person promised to- a promisee and 
a promisor. Could S be a promisor and a promisee simultaneously? The case where I promise 
myself that I will quit over-eating on Thanksgiving seems like such an instance. However, this is 
more a "vow" or a "resolution" than a "promise." A promise is something that is communal by 
nature. It is something said, or at least communicated, to another person. What about the 
statement, "I promise there will be hell to pay if you miss curfew one more time!" Though this 
statement uses the language of promise and involves two people, it is obvious that it is not what is 
intended by a promissory principle. A promise is not just information on one's future plans, but 
instead a statement of commitment between two people. This is fundamental. However, the 
statement, "I promise that if you go to Austria the natives will treat you well if you at least 
attempt to speak German" is also not a promise, though it seems to a form of commitment 
between two people. It is not within the reasonable control of the promisor to keep her end of the 
bargain; therefore, she does not have the power to really evoke a promise. Moreover, the 
agreement between Jimmy "the guns" Atkinson and Johnny "the boss" Malone to kill Two-faced 
Tony for X amount of dollars cannot qualify as a promise, though it fulfills several of the other 
characteristics. For a promise to be ethical, it must be moral in both form and content. 
A promise, then, is considerably more complicated than any cursory or superficial 
understanding. There is a difference between the word "promise" and the morality of promising. 
As already explained, promise finds its basis in, around, and through two or more moral agents. 
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As Melden writes, " ... promise is no idle prediction, no mere expression of a wish, hope or even 
resolution, but a transaction between persons who are united by the bond of mutual respect in 
some sort of moral community" (Melden 43). It is here that an explanation is due to clarify 
against what ideological framework such terms as "agent" and "mutual respect" are being used. 
A. Kant 
Words like "agent," "mutual respect," "autonomous," "trust," and "duty" often find their 
roots in the ideas set forth by the foremost German production of the Enlightenment, Emmanuel 
Kant. This essay is not on Kant. However, a short discussion on Kantian ethics is necessitated in 
order to further articulate and augment Fried's discussion of promise. 
The moralist of duty, however, sees promising as a device that free, moral individuals 
have fashioned on the premise of mutual trust, and which gathers its moral force from 
that premise ... There exists a convention that defines the practice of promising and its 
entailments. This convention provides a way that a person may create expectation in 
others. By virtue of the basic Kantian principles oftrust and respect, it is Y\'Tong to 
invoke that convention in order to make a promise, and then to break it (Fried 17). 
Melden also discusses Kant in relation to his central thesis. 
It is, I venture to suggest, the consideration that communication is not idle talk that comes 
and goes without engaging the interests ofthose who receive it, that lies behind Kant's 
notion that telling the truth is to be ranked with keeping one's promises as a perfect duty, 
when, in Foundations, he discusses the second of the four cases in which he seeks to 
illustrate the manner in which the Principle of the Categorical Imperative may be 
employed (Melden 59). 
Kant, put simply, is arguing that the human state of being is the fundamental principle of 
morality. Morality is not based on the force of certain motives, characteristics, or desires, but 
rather on the basis that all have the status of "rational being." As a rational being, one 
understands that she is only but a member of a community of rational beings, and therefore has no 
more or fewer rights, privileges, and duties than the rest of that community. Roughly stated, we 
are equal. Also, as a rational being, one has a will, which is both rational, and at liberty to decide 
and to undertake projects. There is therefore a certain lawfulness or code whereby rational beings 
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must operate in order to have mutual respect for other persons and their projects. Respect is 
fundamental to being in such a community. As Kant writes in Foundations of the Afetaphysics of 
Morals, "Duty is the necessity of an action done from respect for the law" (Fried 117). All laws 
and conventions, then, are tied into this idea of respect for other moral agents, which is really an 
attempt to apply an element of universality to rational, moral decisions. 
Kant provides a powerful tool for applications in promise. For Kant, to fall to meet the 
requirements of morality in rational applications like universality is to violate one's own nature as 
a rational beings as well as doing violence to other people's autonomy. Basically, when one is 
immoral, one demeans oneself, and with this comes a sense of shame or guilt that is a result of 
one's diminished worth.! 
Fried's understanding of promise really begins and ends inside this Kantian backdrop and 
the "liberal ideal." He goes on to say that a promise is something (1) that must be communicated, 
(2) that a promisee must accept a certain responsibility as the beneficiary of that promise (a issue 
of acceptance), (3) that responsible behavior by both parties before, during, and after the transfer 
is also a part of promise, and (4) that issues of good faith and freedom must also be involved. 
However, the vastness of his argumentation hinges upon a single issue- autonomy. "The moral 
force behind contract as promise is autonomy: the parties are bound to their contract because they 
have chosen to be" (Fried 57). Of course such a focus on autonomy leaves him open to several 
counter-arguments. For example, consider the following: Is there any real sense of free agency in 
the majority of contract law? Does the continuation of the idea of self extend through time? Can 
a corporation become the single rational agent that is required to enter into a moral community? 
Does this Kantian ethical approach neglect issues of personhood in the 
I There is a lot to criticize here. First such a focus on rationality seems to be distinctly masculine in tenns 
of suspending other parts of what it is to be human i.e. intuition, contextualization, embodiment, feeling, 
emotion, sentiment, action., speech, ad infintmn. We are not dealing with other common attributes in our 
day-to-day lives, but instead other persons. However, I believe, as does Fried and Melden, that Kant is 
useful in terms of a moral arrow pointing us in the right direction, but not a principle, which is right in and 
of itself. 
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individual sense? Do we need to examine the promise itself, and not just the relationship ofthe 
promisee and the promisor? In various chapters Fried partially accounts for some ofthese 
questions in Contract as Promise. However, his explanation remains insufficient, and two 
essential questions for Fried arrive: 1) Are the ethics of promise richer and more nuanced than 
Fried gives credit? 2) Can promise, as defined here, explain fully the different areas of contract 
law? 
B. Form of Contract 
Fried divides his book Contract as Promise into sections that roughly follow the basic 
areas of contract law. This section will be devoted to a terse summary of what he writes in each 
area. This will prove to be vital, for the language and definition he uses must supply his 
argument with the framework of both contract and promise. These sections will be used to 
explain problematic areas such as unconscionability, detrimental reliance, and impossibility. 
1. Offer and Acceptance/ Agreement 
Fried's summary of offer and acceptance is the following. 
A promises x to B, if B will promise y to A. A's conditional promise is called in law the 
offer, B's the acceptance. B's promise serves three overlapping functions. (1) It satisfies 
the condition in A's offer. (2) It is "acceptance" in the general sense that all promissory 
obligation is reciprocal and so all promises must be accepted, even unconditional ones. 
(3) It furnishes the consideration that the Anglo-American law generally requires to make 
a promise legally binding. A is not bound until the condition is fulfilled. Where the 
promisor specifies acceptance by a counterpromise, that counterpromise an by itself 
closes the circuit of promissory obligation. For a promise to be binding, it must be 
accepted, and how that acceptance is to be conveyed to the promisor, indeed whether it 
must be conveyed at all, is something the promisor can specify at the time he makes his 
offer-promise. What is necessary is that the acceptance be unequivocal or irrevocable, or 
else it will not close the circuit (Fried 50). 
Fried points out himself that contract law is very complex and this complexity, such as 
the one given above, may lead one to conclude that such a primary institution of promising could 
not account for such technicalities. However, if stated in other terms, it will be recognizable to 
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ordinary understanding. For a promise to be complete it must be made to someone and that 
beneficiary must, in some sense, welcome that promise. It is in essence that simple, but the 
language must be nuanced enough to deal with all the possible variations of how the "making of' 
and the "receiving" of a promise may look. Notice also that the need for acceptance by the 
promisee show a certain willingness by both parties, for there could be a case where the benefit 
could be unwanted by the promisee later. The promisee must have the chance at some point to 
refuse the promise. As Fried uses as an illustration, the moral potency of a promise could be seen 
as an electric current that must be completed in order to carry a current. There are two switches: 
the promisor's, which is the offer; and the promisee's, which is the acceptance. Both must 
voluntarily be activated for a promise to carry moral weight. 
2. Consideration/ Bargain 
Consideration can be defmed as something given or promised in exchange for a promise. 
Some use consideration to prove that promise is distinct from contract. But what challenge does 
it pose? Fried analyzes consideration as the following: 
(A) The consideration that in law promotes a mere promise into a contractual obligation 
is something, or the promise of something, given in exchange for the promise. (B) The 
law is not at all interested in the adequacy of the consideration. The goodness of the 
exchange is for the parties alone to judge- the law is concerned only that there be an 
exchange (Fried 29). 
Such a conception of consideration attempts to validate both the freedoms of the parties while 
holding onto the form of exchange. Fried bases his argument that this cannot be done; that, in 
fact, these two ideas are indeed contradictory. 
Fried seems asserts that the issue of consideration is "too internally inconsistent" to offer 
a challenge to contract as promise. Proposition B is an attempt to stay within the bounds of the 
liberal ideal, where individual parties exercise free-will to determine their own arrangements, and 
those arrangements should be respected absolutely. However, proposition A immediately begins 
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to limit the class of arrangements to only "real," not artificial or unreasonable bargains, thereby it 
entails social policies that override the freedom of the individual in their potential projects of 
promising. Fried would argue that, if there were to be freedom of contract, it would only proceed 
by a freedom of promising. Consideration limits both and, as such, is an obstruction of the liberal 
ideal and rational projects that might therein be contained. 
Fried is not actually advocating the dismissal of consideration, for he mentions that 
consideration is still a tool, though a very awkward one, which lends force to a multitude of 
arrangements that might be otherwise non-obligatory. However, despite convergent reasons for 
the existence of consideration, it alone offers no necessary or sufficient rationale that could be 
seen as a firm alternative for promise as the basis of contract. On the other hand, in this section 
Fried added several noteworthy amendments to his thesis. They are the following: 1) A promise 
must be freely made. 2) A promise cannot be unfair or unjust. 3) The promise must have been 
made rationally and deliberately, thus providing that subsequent legal enforcement was 
contemplated at the time of making the promise. Notice that these additions are in no way 
contradictory to his argumentation thus far, but are expansions that are not clearly logical 
outgrowths of this argumentation. Fried is, to an extent, qualifying his argument so as to be able 
to deal with a multitude of issues that will present themselves later in this paper. This is not so 
much a criticism as it is a simple denoting that Fried is beginning to build certain other principles 
into promise as contract, which mayor may not have already been there. 
3. Legalityl Remedies 
For Fried, if contract is to be based on a promissory principle, remedies must hold to 
expectations as the primary consideration. However, he does admit that there are certain cases 
where the "natural" thing to do is to give damages for the harm that has been suffered rather than 
the value of the promised expectation. Nevertheless, he points out that it does not follow from 
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these cases that such a expectation is not a "normal and natural" principle to allocate damages as 
a result of breach of contract. 
For his first example, there are cases where that value is impossible to measure, such as 
lost opportunities. In such cases, only calculable damages can be repaid as a remedy, and thus 
they seem to be the natural basis for a ruling. Second, there are cases such as the following. 
A buyer requests a manufacturer to make an inexpensive widget for a large machine. The 
manufacturer produces the widget, but it is made poorly. When the buyer uses the widget in the 
machine, it breaks down and causes damage to the machine and lost production time. Under the 
strict terms of expectation, the manufacturer only owes the buyer a new, better-made widget. 
However, this is clearly unjust. It seems more natural to say that the manufacturer induced the 
buyer's reasonable reliance and should therefore compensate for harm done by that reliance. In 
this case the promissory principle is still implied, but justice calls for other principles that go 
beyond expectation. It is hard to define Fried's position on exactly what other principles are 
included in contract and where and when they should be applied. He \\-TItes such things as the 
following: 
... it is sufficient to introduce the notion that contract as promise has a distinct but neither 
exclusive nor necessarily dominant place among legal and moral principles .... Promise 
and restitution are distinct principles. Neither derives from the other, and so attempts to 
dig beneath promise in order to ground contract in restitution (or reliance, for that matter) 
is misconceived. Contract is based on promise, but when something goes wrong in the 
contract process- when people fail to reach agreement, or break their promises- there will 
usually be gains and losses to sort out (Fried 25-26). 
This would imply that reliance and restitution are apt tools to find a principle of justice to 
exonerate harm. But at what point does one principle become fairer? And if one is primarily 
concerned about fairness, then should not a principle of fairness itself be the primary basis of 
contract and all other law? 
Despite these questions, it is clear that in the above case reliance is not threatening to 
expectation because expectation simply does not go far enough is this case. It is when the 
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converse is true, when expectation goes beyond reliance and other such principles, that Fried 
must argue that rulings should still be based on expectation because contract is founded on 
promise. In any event, Fried still makes his point that just because reliance is used to decide a 
case in and around contract, it does not necessarily mean that contract as promise is not at work. 
III. What Others Say 
If contract is grounded in promise, then the relief must be measured by expectation. If 
this cannot be done, then it would mean that a contract finds its grounding elsewhere. This is the 
basis for Atiyah's attack. Atiyah's criticism, which will be the only criticisms to be looked here 
in some detail, is a criticism of the detail, spirit, and history of Fried's case. 
Remember Fried's case rests invariably on the ideals of personal autonomy, free will, 
responsibility, and other such traditional liberal values. Atiyah, however, notes that other less 
desirable consequences come inescapably with such Victorian ethics. 1 Such consequences would 
involve an immediate questioning of free agency. This code of ethics would favor those who, 
through aptitude, education, and financial well being, are more likely to be able to exercise their 
free choice, thereby extending and perpetuating the original inequalities. Thus, if one were to see 
holding contracts as absolutely binding as a form of risk allocation, the advantaged persons would 
have an edge at ascertaining future risks. 
On the other hand, other stratagems ofliability rest on different ideals that bring with 
them different consequences. For example, consider benefit-based liability, which is to say cases 
where the primary purpose is to remedy unjust enrichment of one party through the hann of 
another. Using such a legal and ethical approach, the courts are now striving to find a just 
reallocation or reciprocity of benefits that were incurred through a contractual relation. This sort 
1 Victorian because Fried himself quotes the idea of the Victorian gentleman, who drives a hard but fair 
bargain. 
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of ruling may still reaffirm the previously mentioned advantaged individual; however, it does not 
go so far as perpetuating this inequality. The premise of reliance-based liability is similar and is 
even more in conflict with the traditional free-will values. According to Atiyah, 
As soon as liabilities come to be placed upon a person in whom another has reposed trust 
or reliance, even though there is no explicit promise or agreement to bear that liability, 
the door is opened to a species of liability which does not depend upon the belief of 
individual responsibility and free choice. Not only is the party relied upon held liable 
without his promise, but the party relying is relieved from the consequences of his o\\'n 
consequences of his own actions. The values involved in this type of liability are 
therefore closely associated with a paternalist social philosophy, and a redistributive 
economic system (Atiyah 10). 
Thus, Atiyah seeks to strike at the heart of Fried's ideological framework and does so by an 
appeal to social philosophy and by a more contextualist approach to the issue as a whole. He 
examines not only arguments specific to promise as contract but also examines the consequences 
of such arguments on a broader, sociological scale. 
However, Atiyah must still explain the particulars of contract law that are not reliant on 
promissory ethics- issues like reliance-based and benefit-based liability. For this purpose he 
makes a distinction between three cases where contract can be held legally binding: 
1) A breech of contract as occurred because payment for services completed was not fully 
delivered. This could be likened to case C in the beginning of this paper. 
2) A breech has occurred where the promisee has fiscally relied on the promise, though 
has not yet completed in totality his end of the bargain, and therefore would be in a better 
position had no promise been made. This could be likened to case B in the beginning of 
this paper. 
3) A breech has occurred where the promisee has in no way relied upon the promise. This 
could likened to case A in the beginning of this paper. 
As might be expected, it is only the third situation which demands some sort of justification in the 
argumentation of promise-based liability and some other sort of liability. The reason is that in the 
first case expectation interests and reliance interests are normally the same. In the second, the 
fact that reliance is already built into the language provides, for this essay's purposes, an adequate 
proof that damages can be seen as reliance-based liability. The third case, however, beckons for 
expectation interests alone, which is to say that reliance or benefit-based liability does not prima 
facia appear to playa role. In short, it has something to do solely with the promise. 
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Atiyah argues, however, that ifthe contract is to be binding and liability addressed in 
such a case, it is for the following reasons. (I) Inherent to promise is a sort of psychological 
expectation. The promisee's rightful expectation would be violated. (2) Contracts are essentially 
a way of allocating risks, and such mechanisms, if they are to make any sense at all, must be 
binding from the onset. However, a rentee who changed his mind as soon as signing a lease 
would not cause the renter harm as long as there was adequate time to find a new person to fill the 
lease. (3) The third argument is simply that if a promissory principle is held as immediately 
binding in law, social custom, or morality, then people would be more likely to perform promises 
as a whole, especially those promises that have already been relied upon. All three of these cases 
are relatively weak in comparison to the justifications for benefit-based or reliance-based liability. 
Atiayh stresses the fact that this "wholly executory" stage of promise or contract is an extremely 
short phase of the relation. In fact, only the a very small minority oflitigation in contract law 
could be considered "wholly executory." 
Atiyah devotes himself to proving that the Anglo-American legal thought's reluctance to 
see contract law as anything other than promise is partially motivated by cultural heritage. It 
should not wholly be abandoned, but understood as at least partially misconceived and needing of 
modification. The tendency of modem law is away from this sort of arguments by principle that 
was foundational in former times, to be replace with stressing the dichotomy between, for 
example, the sanctity of a contract that has not yet been relied upon, and one that has. The void is 
a conceptual and perhaps even linguistic lack of recognition of this difference. Atiyah argues that 
pre-nineteenth century contractual relations where thought of as something that was a 
community-sanctioned relation between persons who, in the course of their dealings, relied on 
each other, both in cases of gain and loss. It was this gain or loss that was to be reallocated, and 
the explicit promise served primarily to establish that reliance on one another. After the 
Enlightenment and Kant, all of this was reversed, and the promise itself became that expectation. 
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IV. A Response to Other Problematic Areas 
The Fried-Atiyah debate is more a debate of world views rather than finely calculable 
argumentation. It is perhaps a non sequitur to ask either man should there be legal force behind a 
contract before it is relied upon, for both men are committed to an answer long before a critical 
observation can be made. This is why this essay has spent an extended amount of space in 
reviewing the background assumptions or beliefs of both men, and perhaps it is only at an 
intuitive level that one can side with one or the other. Therefore the spirit of the situation is just 
as important as the details of the argumentation. 
Perhaps, one way to appreciate the spirit of Fried's thought is through an examination of 
his own remarks on Shakespeare's Merchant o..fVenice in retaliation to Unger's treatment of the 
characters Belmont and Venice. In the Merchant o..fVenice, Belmont symbolizes the domain of 
altruism and Venice the domain of harsh bargaining. The contrast is between commercial and 
family relations. The former is governed by the literal, formal doctrines of contract that must be 
respected. The latter is governed by a sense of sharing and sacrifice. The liberal ideal, according 
to Unger, forces a rigid dichotomy between these two domains. Fried asks though: Is family not a 
group of freely determined agents under a form of contract? In commercial relations is there a 
lack of sharing? The desire to maintain goodwill so as to continue business in the future would 
naturally generate a concern for one's fellow man, customer, and business partner. Remember 
that all projects based on promise involve a common goal. Contract is latent with a sense of a 
communal, if not "shared," purpose. Fried argues that the contrast between Venice and Belmont 
is simply artificial: 
Nothing in the liberal concept of contract, nothing in the liberal concept of humanity and 
law makes such altruism improbable or meaningless. The disposition to VIew one 
another with kindness and forbearance is an affirmative good, which liberalism is in no 
way committed to deny_ But, just as in the family, the enforcement of such a posture 
itself tends to tyranny. Parties enter into contractual relations with certain expectations; 
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for the state to disappoint those expectations is on its part a form of tyranny and 
deception (Fried 91). 
It is therefore essential for Fried that in order for justice to work in the liberal ideal, expectations 
of rational projects by autonomous individuals must not be in any way mitigated. This is 
consistent with both the domains of Venice and Belmont. 
A. Gap Issues! Sharing 
A problem arises placing the principle of promise as contract at such a lofty state. Can 
Fried explain what happens when a case cannot be defined strictly under this contract principle? 
For example, cases that one might call "contractual accidents." What happens when there are 
"gaps" in what happens and what the contract was supposed to be? Fried defines gap issues as 
when the relations between the parties are not governed by the actual promises they have made, 
but are governed by residual general principles of law. These gaps cannot be filled by the 
contract. But, given his views of contract law, how should these discrepancies be addressed? 
Fried introduces a principle of sharing. The sharing principle comes into play when (1) 
both parties are harmed or benefited, (2) no agreement obtains that particular result, (3) no one in 
the relationship is culpable, and (4) no one has conferred a benefit. In essence, spread the wealth 
and the responsibility where no rights or obligations are violated or threatened. Obviously, this 
fills a few gaps. But why limit this resource allocation to only parties involved? If the parties 
must share both the harm and benefits of such contractual accidents, why not then impose a rule 
that the entire community will reap the burdens and benefits of all transactions? However, all 
would lose their autonomy in such a society as well as their personhood and, thereby, the basis 
for a promise. 
In the end there would be full sharing, and no one would enjoy the benefits or bear the 
responsibility of his personal choices- indeed of his person ... The present political system 
seeks only to reduce the extreme disparities in overall wealth that undermine the 
possibility of community, but at the same time protect and provide opportunities for 
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advancement and a guaranteed social minimum ... .1 affirm that this structure and its 
purposes are in principle sound (Fried p71-72). 
The reason for limiting the principle of sharing to only involved parties is that they have 
already come into a contract and are thereby in a common enterprise. It is a relation freely 
chosen. Fried argues that one has a greater requirement for previously established personal 
relations than one does for an abstract ideal of fellow citizens. Further, the principle of sharing 
does not threaten the promissory principle for the simple reason that the parties were free to 
decide on different terms of meaning and the extent of their relationship in the first place. 1 
B. Duress! Unconscionability 
Another point of contention for Fried arises when all the necessary elements of contract 
law are filled but are still ruled unfair. There are two legal possibilities: duress and 
unconscionability. The latter will be addressed first. 
Unconscionable terms are those where the promisor had no real choice and the actual 
terms are substantially unfair to her, particularly in view of her poverty or relative powerlessness. 
Unconscionability concentrates on the imbalance, the "substantive unfairness" of the agreement 
itself. Fried asks where does the sentiment lie? What if a business cannot exist unless it hires 
migrant workers at low wages? They seem to be exploited. But should the owner of such a 
business be the representative of society's redistributive zeal? Was the business not offering 
increased opportunities for the poor, though limited they may be? The misfortune of the situation 
is not a responsibility for which either of the contracting parties can be seen as culpable. 
Redistribution can not be a burden to be bore at random or in an ad hoc fashion. It should not be 
I But does forcing others to share any responsibility threaten a loss of autonomy and the chances of gain 'via 
individual talents, efforts, and accomplishments? Is this a form of anti-social Danvinism in that the weaker 
is allowed to triumph over the stronger? What happens when one wins the capitalist game? One is subject 
to anti-trust laws and your company must start over i.c. Bill Gates. This is a sort of manifestation of the 
dialectic between capitalism and socialism that is the American system. 
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limited to only those who have an economic interaction with the poor. Fried admits that this part 
of the liberal ideal seems harsh and uncaring, but, as he argues, the goal of distributive justice in 
such a political theory is a collective action, pursued and funded by the whole. Basically, the 
business owner above already paid her taxes to insure that unskilled labor has sufficient means to 
better their position in life. To make her pay twice is unfair. The liberal ideal is a goal of an all-
reaching and embracing principle of justice. Curing the poverty, not the arrangement, is the only 
remedy under such a goal. 
Duress, as opposed to unconscionability where the injustice is in the agreement itself, is 
injustice in the making of the agreement. It is important that, in order to prove duress, the 
"victim" is aware of what is in fact transpiring and also his relative lack of freedom to do 
otherwise. Their assent to the agreement is not voluntary. This, of course, poses a threat to 
promise as contract. If a person fully appreciates the alternatives and chooses among them, how 
can he not be "free?" Perhaps the court would have to look to the issue of "motivation." 
However, in all contractual agreements the parties both have "motivation" or else the contract 
would not exist. Perhaps the courts would have to look to the relative advantages or 
disadvantages of the parties? However, it would seem inconsistent to hold rich but not poor 
people to their bargains. Fried argues that duress would then have to come to an issue of 
coerCIOn. 
"A proposal is not coercive if it offers what the proponent has a right to offer or not as he 
chooses. It is coercive it if proposes a wrong to the object of the proposal" (Fried 97). Basically, 
a promise, which is brought about by a threat to violate that promisor's natural rights, no longer 
has moral force and thus loses contractual force. It should be such threats that constitute the legal 
category of duress and, according to the definition put forward by Nozick, it is the moral category 
of coercion. Though both parties have an agreement and knowingly and freely made a contract, 
there are still limitations under duress for the simple reason that one party's autonomy has been 
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diminished. Fried is then able to explain duress in a way that is completely consistent with his 
liberal ideal and thus promise as contract. 
c. Bad/ Good Samaritans 
Interestingly, there are bargains that meet all of the requirements laid out thus far, which 
can still be deemed to harsh to enforce. Fried gives the example of Post v. Jones where two 
whaling vessels happened upon a third vessel which was disabled and in need of assistance. They 
agreed to help the third and split the vessel's cargo between themselves for which they paid the 
disabled vessel's captain a small percentage of the cargo's land value as a salvage fee. The case 
was later overturned by the Supreme Court and the two rescuers where forced to pay a normally 
allowed fee for salvage. Fried argues that this is again consistent with promise as contract 
because the liberal ideal does not eliminate a duty to help others in distress. In fact, this is 
entirely consistent with an idea of autonomy: for, if one takes seriously her own autonomy, then 
she has certain obligations with respect to other's autonomy. 
In this case the distressed party was not disabled due to a general social dispensation but 
rather because of a random event for which no systematic provision could be provided. It is this 
element of randomness that Fried sees as putting the parties involved in a "state of nature" 
whereby one has a duty of humanity to help a stranger in distress. The liberal ideal is different in 
that it seeks to give freedom to how one attempts to accommodate this duty. The individual can 
pursue her own concept of good without being overwhelmed and outweighed by the needs of 
others. The terms mentioned in the case above, according to a Kantian ethical approach, would be 
immoral because they devalue one's own humanity and common humanity in their disregard for 
respect of another autonomous individual's natural rights. It is therefore clear that the agreement 
was morally degrading to all parties involved. Fried admits that legally defining what positive 
duties the other two vessels actually had would be difficult, but the violations of those duties and 
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the prescribed remedies are much clearer. "We may hesitate to grant an affirmative action against 
one who fails to act as a good Samaritan. We need not hesitate at all to deny the bad Samaritan 
his unjust profit" (Fried 111). 
D. Restitution! Conditions 
Fried's conception of promise and restitution (or reliance) as distinct principles is 
logically necessitated by his firm belief in promise as contract. In his last chapter entitled The 
Importance of Being Right. Fried explains the sharp contrasts in remedies that result from the 
respective principle. In either case, the importance of being "in the right" cannot be understated. 
When one looks to remedies, one sees that instead of a smooth continuum in recovery allocation, 
there are sharp discontinuities in the awarding of damages that hinge on fine distinctions and a 
determination of who is "in the right." Large consequences tum on, to the non-legal mind, 
seemingly small and even trivial differences in language and conduct. "Such discontinuities are 
unavoidable, and are indeed a sign that we are dealing in the area of right and wrong, which is the 
domain of discontinuities ... , if the domain of right and wrong is seen as autonomous, then there 
must be sharp breaks: between the permissible and the impermissible, between the obligatory and 
the optional" (Fried 132). Fried then seeks to show that the extreme variability of these 
consequences proves that contract law is in fact a moral issue. 
Fried asks us to consider the following case. 
A Builder undertakes to build a house to have certain specifications for completion by a 
certain date. He does not complete it in time and there are slight departures from the plan 
(for instance, a different but equivalent brand of waste pipe is used). The o",ner claims 
that since the specifications and the completion time were expressly denominated 
conditions, he is released from his obligation and may keep the house without paying for 
it (Fried 123). 
The idea strikes one obviously as unfair and absurd. Why? Fried's doctrine of 
conditions does not specify that when one breeches a contract, that the person is liable for both 
restitution and the original obligation. As soon as the owner claims that the builder wavered from 
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the conditions of the agreement and thus nullified the contract, the builder (and the owner) is no 
longer responsible for obligations in that contract. The builder has indeed forfeited his rights 
under the contract and is therefore considered not to be "in the right," but he is released from its 
duties as well. Fried would argue that if that condition-holder (usually the promisee) chooses to 
retain the goods, she must still pay for them. This is indeed an application of restitution damages 
instead of expectation damages because the contract, and thus the promise, is now void. So what 
about the half-built house? After the contract is broken, there is still a conferred benefit, but that 
benefit cannot simply be reallocated to the correct party (One cannot return a half-built house.) 
The owner can refuse to pay in the contract amount, but instead she can offer to pay no more than 
a fair market price for the services provided, thought she is of course not obligated to make this 
offer. This is logical since the basis for payment is no longer contract but restitution. This 
distinction, though small, could mean a quite significant change is the amount paid for the house.! 
The possible variance between restitution and promissory principles in contract 
resolution is a definite sort of alternation. The monetary amount awarded can be traced to one 
principle or the other, but according to Fried, never to both. Fried holds these as distinct and 
separate entities that both play separate roles around contractual relations. As Fried argues, the 
restitution principle is "more primitive" and often closer to what general justice requires in 
contracts between two strangers. However, when a promise is made, it reflects a supplanting of a 
voluntary system that is created by both parties over and above this more primitive ethic of 
restitution. However, both ethical systems have the possibility of being used as a basis for 
remedy if a party fails to remain in substantial compliance with her contractual obligations. This 
again is proof ofthe invaluable attribute of being in the right. In such a system as described in 
this section, it can be seen that the promisee holds a superior position over the promisor because 
1 Damages as a result of breaking a contrac~ may go further thanjust the original swn contracted, but be 
extended to the damages actually incurred by the promisee i.e. as brought about by inflation. This is still 
consistent with promise as contract. This is the importance of being "in the right." 
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she is the "condition-holder." It is far easier for the promisee to claim that the promisor has 
broken the terms of the agreement then vice versa. Therefore, the doctrines of waiver, 
repudiation, and estoppel are safeguards of a sort against this unequal power basis. A promise 
may call for sacrifices that exceed the requirements of residual, background nonpromissory 
principles such as those offaimess and decency. At times those principles could even be seen as 
favorable, thus providing motivation for breech of contract. This spirit of equalization of 
responsibility explains also why a victim of breech of contract is required to act prudently in an 
attempt to mitigate the possible harm or loss incurred. Such a hypothesis reverts back to the idea 
of the responsible agency of both parties at all times before, during, and after the contract. 
v. Add a Little Melden 
This paper has covered what Fried thinks of promise, but is his discussion sufficient for 
other moral philosophers? Melden would argue that Fried's discussion is still simplistic. This 
limited definition would do violence to the complex contours of the principles of promise (let 
alone contract law). Within the scope of this essay, Fried would do well to embrace Melden's 
opinions on promise, for Fried is asking a lot of promise and must seek to find the fullest sense of 
what happens when S promises P to T. To bolster Fried's case for promise as contract, one could 
conceivably offer a stronger argument through Melden and thus become more Fri('-dian than Fried 
himself by extending the morality of promise to encompass other subtleties in contract. Melden 
spells out the following as the "full-blooded" paradigm case of promise . 
.. , the promise locution is employed (a) in good faith by a responsible agent, (b) freely 
and without constraint or duress of any form, (c) to assure the addressee that the speaker 
will do something clearly manageable by him without undue effort or sacrifice, 
something that in some strong sense is possible or manageable, (d) something that is 
morally acceptable and without hurt or moral damage to himself or anyone else, (e) 
something desired and indeed required by the person to whom the promise: is given in 
order for him. Or someone else in whom the latter has an interest, to carry on with some 
program or line of action. Further, (f) the assurance thus given is accepted in good faith 
on the terms represented by the user of the promise-locution by an equally responsible 
agent, who (g) respects, and in tum is respected by the concern not only for the other 
23 
--
-
party to the promise-transaction but indeed for anyone else whose interests may be 
affected by what transpires in consequence of that promise ... (h) The obligation incurred 
is an obligation to the promisee such that the recipient of the promise has a right, or is 
entitled by that promise, to the performance of that action in question. (i) Failure to meet 
that obligation, in the event that failure is willful, is a case not merely of hurting, 
disappointing or frustrating the promisee, but of wronging him as a person, i.e. doing 
moral damage to him because of the violation of this right; and U> the moral damage 
inflicted entitles a promisee thus wronged to demand redress from the person guilty of 
this transgression; and (k) the person to whom the promiser is obliged has the 
responsibility, if circumstances warrant it, to waive or relinquish his right, and to forgive 
the person who has transgressed against him given appropriate indication of the remorse 
felt for guilt that has been incurred (Melden 43-44). 
Melden establishes that a promise in not a trivial matter, but instead a whole moral networking 
between the promisor, the promisee, and the promise itself. Notice that not one of these 
conditions in anyway mitigates or is opposed to Fried, but instead they are adding to the array. 
One's goal here is not to find sufficient and necessary properties of promise. It is more probable 
that in every day life when S promises P to action T, that only condition (a),(b),(c),(f),(k) and (j) 
are satisfied (or some such combination), but one would still want to say that S has promised P to 
T. Does this mean that the rest are arbitrary? Indeed not. This is the definition of trying to 
discover an ethical principle by finding its paradigm case. As Fried point out, one could fmd a 
linguistic solution here as Wittgenstein did using a Wortspiel. All of these concepts are circles 
that partially interlock other circles, and somewhere in common space lies a concept of promise. 
However, what is really under scrutiny here is not the commonality, but the particular. To find if 
contract is promise, one must first know with some detail those contours of promise, and that is 
what Melden has provided. 
Again the question is posed, "what happens when S promises action T to P?" The new 
answer would look something like the following. 
When S successfully promises P that she will do action T, then S is intending P to believe 
that she will perform T, by way of some communication, and S is undertaking or creating 
upon herself an obligation to do action T. Therefore, P is justified and has the right to 
rely on S's intent to do action T and that action T is in fact done. She also has the power 
to release or relieve her from this promise. P has the power to doubt that action T will 
actually occur because she knows that things can change, therefore she retains an element 
of good judgment and reasonable, responsible action in her pseudo-assumption that 
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action T will take place. However, her attitude does not actually affect the right that she 
has acquired. 
In comparison to Fried's earlier discussion of promise, this is now sort ofless naive model of 
promise, and, as such, deserves to be further analyzed. Notice that there is an element of reliance 
that adds moral weight. The clear delineation between reliance and expectation that Fried 
proposes has now become integrated out of necessity. In this model P is still understood to be a 
responsible agent who, as such, is culpable for the amount of reliance on action T, but retains the 
right to see the fulfillment of the contract under the agreed upon terms. This gives credence to an 
idea that relying must, itself, be justified by a right to do so, and even when this right is acquired, 
there must remain an element of prudence on the part of P. However, once justified reliance has 
been established, a breach in the promise would be even more destructive to the moral 
relationship of the parties, and the damages that actually are a result of such a breach would 
increase as well. This would also mean that the wholly unrelyed promise is somewhat weak in 
moral force. l 
VI. More Friedian than Fried 
The basic elements of contract law look something like this: 
A. Mutual Agreement: both parties enter into a binding relationship, and there is a 
"meeting of the minds" on the terms of that agreement. 
B. Competent Parties/ Capacity: the parties must have legal ability to contract. 
C. Consideration: something bargained for or given in exchange for a promise. 
D. Legality/ Lawful Purpose: the subject matter of the contract must be legal. 
1 Notice also that P has another power i.e. the power to relieve or release. What is the distinction? IfP 
releases S from her obligation to perform action T, then the promise has been dissolved along with any sort 
of obligation. In a manner of speaking, "the slate as been wiped clean." On the other hand, if P where to 
relieve S of her end of the bargain, then there would be no culpability for non-perfonnance, though 
obligation would go on (P may have other reason for performing T such as a preservation of integrity, etc.) 
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One can see that when compared with Melden' s paradigm case, structurally contract law and 
promise are indeed closely related. However, if one is to supply a coherent theory of contract as 
promise, one must also look to remedies in past verdicts to see if, in fact, what criteria is used in 
court rulings. The areas ofunconscionabiltiy, duress, and detrimental reliance have been noted 
especially to try and prove the issue problematic 
After the addition of such contours that Melden would bring into promise as applied to 
Fried, one might wonder if this notion of promise still falls within the common understanding of 
promise. In other words, what is the limit of what one could write into the ethics of promise in 
order to substantiate promise as contract? For example, is not the idea of responsibility already 
built into this notion of promise? This is a fair question and one with which this paper is deeply 
involved. It will be addressed primarily in the section over remedies in contract law. Notice how 
often other moral considerations are already built into the language of contract. This issue will be 
taken up later in this paper. 
VII. Remedies and Test Cases 
There are a variety of stratagems whereby a plaintiff can proceed in bringing suit for 
breech of contract. These different approaches depend upon which sort of remedies is most 
advantageous for her position: in some cases it could be expectation, and in others., restitution. 
Likewise, the court can also choose from a variety of different principled approaches to the 
remedies such as stated above. Certain modification of rules stated by their predecessors may be 
necessitated to insure that "modem" justice is enacted. An inherent and inevitable flexibility 
presents itself in the dealings of contract law and remedies around that law. 
Fried admits that if contractual remedies are based greatly on anything other than 
expectation interests, his case is flawed. This, then, becomes an essential crux of the entire 
debate. However, consider for moment that often expectation (where the plaintiff would be ifthe 
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contract had been carried out) is a difficult, tangible entity to identify. Unfortunately, one is 
dealing with the issue of "lost history," and consequently the fiscal number will always be 
completely hypothetical. The court is left with only certain general principles arising form the 
legal precedent to arrive at a sum. Armed with these principles one can make a loose distinction 
between "damages" and "restitution". 
A. Basis of Remedies 
The remedies to breech of contract and contract law is perhaps analogous to the 
relationship between punishment and penal code: they are the price that one must take under 
consideration before breaking a contract. Without such punishment commerce as we know it 
could not remain the same. With respect to remedies, common law courts in the past three 
hundred years have formulated clear philosophies in case of breach of contract. 
A. Expectation interests: the innocent party ought to be put in as good a position as jfthe 
contract has been performed. 
B. Reliance interest: the innocent part ought to be reimbursed for any loss cause by a 
reliance on the contract. 
C. Restitution interest: the innocent part ought to be restored any benefit that he has 
bestowed on the other party. 
D. Stipulated Damages: both parties agreed to a fixed some in event of breach of contract 
E. Punitive Damages: only available when the defendant is guilty of reprehensible 
conduct and the damages are designed to punish and discourage similar conduct. 
All of these serve as distinctions that allow a court to come to a just settlement for remedies. 
However, do these fit into the ideas of promise already discussed? The answer to this question is 
a crucial one for contract as promise. If A, B, and C are a part of promise, then the law in 
practice would appear to adhere to a promise paradigm. If not, it would mean that contract, 
though perhaps related to promise, has indeed grown or evolved into something distinctly 
different. Let us return to Meldon's paradigm of promise . 
... the promise locution is employed (a) in good faith by a responsible agent, (b) freely 
and without constraint or duress of any form, (c) to assure the addressee that the speaker 
will do something clearly manageable by him without undue effort or sacrifice, 
something that in some strong sense is possible or manageable, (d) something that is 
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something desired and indeed required by the person to whom the promise is given in 
order for him. Or someone else in whom the latter has an interest, to carry on with some 
program or line of action. Further, (f) the assurance thus given is accepted in good faith 
on the terms represented by the user of the promise-locution by an equally responsible 
agent, who (g) respects, and in turn is respected by the concern not only for the other 
party to the promise-transaction but indeed for anyone else whose interests may be 
affected by what transpires in consequence of that promise ... (h) The obligation incurred 
is an obligation to the promisee such that the recipient of the promise has a right, or is 
entitled by that promise, to the performance of that action in question. (i) Failure to meet 
that obligation, in the event that failure is willful, is a case not merely of hurting, 
disappointing or fiustrating the promisee, but ofvvTonging him as a person, i.e. doing 
moral damage to him because of the violation of this right; and (j) the moral damage 
inflicted entitles a promisee thus \\Tonged to demand redress from the person guilty of 
this transgression; and (k) the person to whom the promiser is obliged has the 
responsibility, if circumstances warrant it, to waive or relinquish his right, and to forgive 
the person who has transgressed against him given appropriate indication of the remorse 
felt for guilt that has been incurred (Melden 43-44). 
The complication comes in the transfer of moral philosophy into the more pragmatic and concrete 
contract law. The reciprocal responsibility of the promisee to forgive the promisor, if warranted, 
is something that is not so often found in the realistic business world. 
B. Breech of Contract and What Happens 
There are, to be sure, thousands of cases on the books where a court ruling upheld a 
contract without considerations outside the stipulations of promise. Cases where the debt owed in 
the case of non-performance or breach of contact was completely based on expectation and the 
parties Kantian autonomy was in no way mitigated. However, these are not the cases that raise 
eyebrows in relation to contract as promise. One must find a case where the court discharged or 
forgave nonperformance even when the basic tenets of contract law has been fulfilled. This 
greatly narrows the search. 
In several instances the court can justify a breech of contract. Questions then arise as to 
the viability of adherence to a notion of promise and autonomy. Are there more considerations 
involved i.e. justice, economic viability, and pragmatism? Another equally important question 
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then would be: Are these considerations themselves outside the gambit found in promissory 
ethics? The tension between these two points becomes the crucial to any possibl~~ solution. 
1. Impossibility/ Personal Inability 
"If the performance due from one party becomes wholly impossible without any fault of 
his own of his employees, he is discharged" (Willston 706). This seems logical in cases where 
actions of the state or "acts of God" are clearly unforeseeable, and thus mitigate the mechanisms 
that were in place when the contract was made. Before the ramifications of this statement are 
examined, a real world example should be provided. Fibrosa Spolka Akeyjna v. Fairbairn L C. 
B. as found in Corbin § 1353, shall serve nicely to prompt the needed discussion. The delivery of 
machines by a seller was made impossible by war. They were the agreed equivalent of the price, 
part of which had been paid in advance. The court judged in favor of restitution of the advance 
payment. The war prevented delivery by the seller and thus "frustrated" the purpose of the buyer. 
Though social conscience often intrudes into the domain of promise, the inability to 
follow through on a promise resulted from circumstances that were completely beyond the 
control of the promisor or promisee. It was no fault of either party. In the law, there also resides 
an element of foreseeability. For if the contract was made in the face of an event that was 
reasonably foreseeable and likely to occur, the breaching party may not be able to pursue this 
defense. Inability is not an absolute. The law encompasses, as is often the case, an extension of 
legally definable culpability into all ofa party's actions. If it were the case that this even had a 
high chance of occurrence, there might be legal ground that holds the defendant somewhat 
accountable. The whole idea is summed up here in Hogg and Bishop §261 . 
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his 
fault by the occurrence of an even the non-occurence of which was a basic assumption on 
which the contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless 
language or the circumastances indicate the contrary. 
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This poses no threat to contract as promise under with the addition of Melden because condition 
(i) calls for a willful breach of contract. Under the terms as defined above, the breach is 
obviously in no way willful and thus still in line with the morality of promise as set forth. 
2. Impossibility after Breach has already occurred 
This area of contract law is included only because it points to another aspect of remedies. 
Impossibility of performance caused by death of a person or by the destruction of specific 
subject matter is not operative as a discharge if the breach for which suit is brought 
occurred before there was any such impossibility. There are cases in which it has 
similarly been held that impossibility is no defense if the promisor would have performed 
before such impossibility existed if they had exercised proper diligence. These decisions 
are justifiable if the pormisor's failure to act diligently was itself a breach going to the 
essence. They certainly should not be approved if the delay was not a breach in itself, 
and if the promisor could and would have performed as required by his contract if 
supervening events not reasonably foreseeable had not prevented such performance 
(Corbin §1341) . 
"Proper diligence" is italicized because it is important to see that already written into the 
law of contract is a certain responsible agency in the proceedings of both the promisor and the 
promisee. Is this appeal to the notion of "proper diligence" part of the ethics of promise? 
Take for example this case of Holt Mfg Co. v. Thornton. A contractor who delayed 
harvesting beyond the agreed time is not free from liability by the fact that a storm destroyed the 
crop and prevented him from harvesting a short time later. Or in the same spirit, unusual rains 
rotted a specific log to be sawed during the latter part of the contracted period. Possibly, the 
promisor was under a duty to act more promptly or with "proper diligence" because the rains, 
though unusual, could have been foreseen in Ruyon v. Culver. 
The fact that this element is introduced into contract law may suggest that something 
above (or behind background principles) and beyond promissory ethics is being implied. 
Nowhere under Fried or Melden is the word "prudent" explicitly used as part of promise (though 
the word has been used in this essay). Rather, it seems to be in the spirit of their thinking. The 
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term "responsible agent" is foundational to both of their discussions. One might reasonably 
assume that the responsible person is also the prudent person. But must it necessarily be so? 
This would give rise to another entire ethical debate that is beyond the scope of this paper. What 
is needed here is simply the observation that the proposed discussion of promise is inextricably 
linked with other ethical principles if it is to be the basis of contract law. 
3. Effect of Unexpected Difficulties and Unprofitablness 
Sometimes, the details of cases cause utilitarian concerns to clearly surpass, in 
practicality, promissory ethics in resolution of breach of contract. 
A supervening discovery of facts that makes the promised performance more difficult or 
expensive, or the occurrence of subsequent events having this effect, if they are such as 
are commonly foreseeable and in contemplation, has almost always been held not to 
discharge the contractor from his duty (Corbin § 13 3 3) • 
This is good news for Fried's case because the court can be seen as unwilling or slow to intervene 
with commitments established by private parties and to avoid any violation of their autonomy. 
However, the word "almost" is what gives rise to another discussion. Again, the casebook should 
be examined first. 
Consider Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard The defendant had a public contract to 
build a bridge out of concrete. The plaintiff agreed to sell gravel from his land at 5¢ per cubic 
yard. The defendant agreed to buy all needed gravel from the plaintiff in order the build the 
bridge. After taking the first 50,000 yards, the defendant discovered the gravel underneath was 
saturated, which thereby caused the gravel ill suited for concrete. He obtained another 51,000 
yard from another seller. The plaintiff sued for damages. The defendant argued that he took all 
the gravel that was "available." The taking of the gravel was not impossible, nor was the 
promised payment, but the defendant could have only used the wet gravel by drying it "ihich 
would have been at a prohibitive cost. Therefore, his hope of profit was frustrated. The 
defendant was discharged because the use of the wet gravel was "impracticable." 
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Consider another example of Vernon v. City o/Los Angeles. Los Angeles had contracted 
to receive and dispose of a certain amount of sewage from the plaintiff for an agreed upon fee. 
Because of a judgment in an action to moderate a public nuisance, Los Angeles was required to 
build a new sewage disposal plant. Los Angeles was held to be discharged from its contractual 
duty to Vernon on the ground of increased cost of performance due to the court order. Two 
judges dissented because it did not appear that the court order was made necessary by the Vernon 
sewage or how great was the increase in cost of the promise performance (disposal of the Vernon 
sewage) caused by the court order. The exact figures were not available and are probably 
necessary to understand the reasons for descent, but they do not affect the present point. What 
needs to be noted is that in both cases economic pressures sufficiently mitigated the original 
contract, and it is these economic pressures that need to be examined in order to come to terms 
with promise as contract. 
Is economic impracticability inside the ethics of promise? Once more, not in those terms, 
but if one were to examine feature (c) there is the phrase "without undue effort or sacrifice." Can 
this be interpreted as economic impracticability? There is indeed a spirit of "practicality" and 
"reasonability" latent in the language. Jfthis can be extended to economic impracticability, then 
yes, it is inside the ethics of promise. As J already stated, the spirit of the Fried and Melden's 
arguments are as active as the particulars. There is a clear logical connection that could be 
constructed between the two, but there may well be several counter examples. This would again 
require argumentation beyond the scope and range of this essay. 
4. Unconscionability 
What makes unconscionability such an interesting issue is that, in such a case, a court 
must change the actual terms of a contract agreed upon by the parties. In effect, the court must 
force its will (usually bolstered by social policy) above the will of the parties involved in the 
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contract. It is clear that this is a key example where social conscience comes into direct conflict 
with allocating absolute responsibility to the wills of the parties. 
Unconscionability focuses on the inception, not the performance, of the contract. The 
contract can be procedurally unconscionable or substantively unconscionable. Procedural would 
be issues such as a lack of knowledge or understanding of contractual terms in fine print, 
unintelligible legal language, or lack of opportunity to read and ask questions about a contract. It 
could also result from a vast disparity in bargaining power. Substantive unconscionability occurs 
when portions of a contract are viewed as overly harsh or oppressive. An example would be a 
provision that leaves one party without remedy to a nonperformance of the other party. 
Historically, relief is not granted unless unconscionability is shown in both areas. 
Hogg and Bishop (§208) give the following as possible options of recourse for the court: 
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made, a court 
may refuse to enforce the contract, or, may enforce the remainder of the contract without 
the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to 
avoid any unconscionable result. 
Consider WL. May Co., Inc. v. Phi/co-Ford Corporation in which a wholesale parts distributor is 
under contract with Philco to sell their parts. The plaintiff was under contractual obligation to 
keep an adequate inventory ofPhilco parts at all times. The agreement was that either party could 
terminate at any time upon written notice of ninety days. Upon termination the distributor would 
no longer be a authorized Philco distributor, and he would have to resell and deliver the Phi1co 
products that Philco elected to repurchase at a mutually agreed price, but not above Philco' s 
current distributor price for those products. Philco terminated and notified the plaintiff that they 
did not intend to repurchase any of its products that were still in possession of the plaintiff 
Philco contended that the ninety days provided adequate time for the distributor to sell profitably 
the remaining stock. This was not the case. The plaintiff brought suit claiming that it was 
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impossible for him to move the remaining inventory under the terms of contract, conditions that 
he charged as unconscionable. 
The court's ruling was that the "repurchase election condition" was an unconscionable 
term. It also determined that the refusal of Philco to repurchase their products at the time of 
termination was a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court 
awarded the plaintiff $6,500 in damages for breach of this implied covenant. The defendant 
contended though that a) the term in question was not unconscionable, b) that danlages (defined 
by expectation) cannot be awarded by unconscionability, and c) that a breach of contract was not 
the alleged complaint and therefore an improper ruling. 
The defense under strict legal terms was correct on all points. The Uniform Code 
Conduct does not define unconscionability; it only suggests the following as a standard 
in §2-302: 
... The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the 
commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as 
to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the 
contract ... The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and 
not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power. 
This would imply that, in reality, the term was not unconscionable. Secondly, even if it were, 
damages can only be awarded in case of a breach of contract (for unconscionability would nullifY 
the contract as thus restitution would be the only governing principle), and that was never the 
claim of the plaintiff The court seemed to disrupt both of these legal principles in lieu of a will 
for fairness. Hogg and Bishop argue that the case should have been reversed; perhaps they are 
correct, but that is not the point here. For promise as contract to be viable and not merely a 
philosophical treatise, it must not only be a clear theoretical basis, but also it must give a 
substantial account for what actually happens in the courtroom. If it does not. then legal minds 
are right to dismiss the debate as unimportant in the day-to-day proceedings of the legal 
community. The court here is acting in what it perceives to be the spirit of justice instead of a 
strictly principled approach. It goes so far as to provide a complaint of breach that was not at first 
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given by the plaintiff. Again, in modem law it has such a power. There is a range of stratagems, 
as already discussed, that a court may employ in order to appropriate and execute justice. The 
fact that a "breach of an implied covenant of good faith" was used demonstrates the court's 
efforts to apply an expectation principle in the remedy in order to ensure that the amount of relief 
was as just and legitimate sum for this case. 
Fried would probably call this an injustice and "Tongful placement of "redistributive 
zeal." However, under the liberal idea there is the idea of a positive duty to affiml one's own 
humanity as well as the humanity of others, and the terms of the contract seem to be an)1hing but 
an affirmation of the party's moral equality. Fried seems to be in a position that is somewhat 
incoherent. As far as Melden is concerned, again feature (c) could be substituted for such a 
ruling, though his precise grounding would be different. Melden could say that this sacrifice 
would be "undue," which would be an appeal to a responsible behavior. Melden's promissory 
ethics could explain this case and perhaps arrive at a similar ruling, but on grounds that diverge 
from the court's criteria. Promise as contract becomes deluded and difficult in the face of such a 
ruling. 
5. What If? 
Let us return now to the following cases. 
Harold, an automobile designer, is contracted by Track Motors to design a new sports 
car. Harold agrees also to provide supervision over its construction in the assembly line to ensure 
that the design is followed accurately. The agreement between them is that Harold will receive 
10% of the manufacturing costs for the first year of production, projected as $250,000, as 
payment for his services of design and supervision. 
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substitute designer. Track Motors communicates this to Harold before Harold begins work on the 
plans. To what damages is Harold entitled? 
(2) Suppose that Harold has completed 60% of his design work, but has not yet began 
any construction or supervision of the assembly line when the owner communicates the same 
repudiation of the contract. Harold has already received $50,000 as a dO\\TI pa}ment towards his 
fees. To what damages is Harold entitled? 
(3) Suppose that Harold is completely finished with his end ofthe bargain but Track 
Motors refuses to pay the last $100,000 due Harold under the contract. To what damages is 
Harold entitled? 
One can now see what it would mean in such cases if contract were based on Fried's 
definition of promise. The ruling for all three would have to be the same amount: the sum that 
would place Harold in as good a position as if the total contract had been performed. If one 
cannot accept this, then one can not accept that promise is the absolute basis for contract. If one 
were to add other contingencies to promise, such as specified by Melden, the answer would 
indeed be closer to what happens in the courtroom. However, it remains unclear if his promissory 
ethic provides the same reasoning as courts would use. Finally, if one were to follow Atiyah' s 
argumentation the remedies would perhaps emerge accordingly to the test case: (I) Little, if any 
harm can be proved, thereby rendering monetary restitution without a solid basis. If there was to 
be a ruling in favor of Harold, it would to intensify the rigidity of the social institution of keeping 
a promise. (2) Harm could now be proved (the cost of 60% of the design, plus copyrights). 
Restitution would now demand reimbursement of that sum from Track Motors. (3) Restitution 
and expectation would result in the same number- $100,000. Siding results from one's O\\TI sense 
of justice and on the rationale of that justice. However, each principle presents its O\\TI 
implications for possible rectification. 
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VII. Where do the Remedies Point? 
Is contract, then, based primarily on promise as defined by these examinations? It would 
be hard to deny that it has a significant role, but any concrete definition of that role is difficult. 
Promise as contract can be applied to unconscionability, unprofitablness, and impossibility before 
and after breach has occurred. However, was promise the fundamental issue'? The most 
frustrating aspect of the problem is that the attorney's that were interviewed for this essay held 
that a contract was a promise. However, when asked about remedies, the ability to prove 
damages, in the general sense, was the main consideration, one that is tied more to restitution than 
to expectation. For example, they wanted to know if Harold had missed an opportunity for other 
work in case (1), thereby creating a harm. There seemed to be no conceptual distinction in these 
practicing legal minds between a pure expectation-harm and a pure restitution-based harm. Which 
causes one to wonder if the practical or conventional does not eventually usurp the conceptual. 
Because a plaintiff often has the option to choose whether to sue according to damages 
(restitution) or according to specifications of the contract, one must wonder if either is more 
fundamental to contract law or is distinct from the other. 
The course of this discussion has been an attempt from varying rationales to find ultimate 
responsibility for law inherent in morality. Is that reasonable? It is assumed that one must find 
firm ideological roots in order to give the courts a justification for ruling in any systemized 
fashion. However, part of law reflects mechanism, and in that mechanism ethical questions 
become irrelevant to a degree. For example, law often proceeds in accordance with custom or 
precedent before moral considerations or an ethical discourse. The procedures a judge uses to 
determine a verdict are often technical in nature, rather than a questioning into Kantian ethics, 
utilitarian injunctions, or questions of what is the "good life." 
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Perhaps the issue of the basis of law is doomed to be an inevitable non sequitur. Every 
ethical, religious, or philosophical system has been or will be argued problematic, incoherent, or 
dogmatic in its suppositions. Why does the Western intellect always search for an absolute 
starting point, when it seems none is to be found? Not that this is a case for ethical nihilism, but 
simply a case for an acceptance that law is more probably based on a balance of institutions and 
historical thought. Evolutionary forces, laws of supply and demand, quests for integrity all seem 
to playa role. The law that is on the books is an exaggeratedly intentional attempt to find precise 
language, but nevertheless the business of defining is a nebulous web of enigmas. Law is then a 
trust in the legal system to find an interpretation of that law that is consistent to individual needs 
and rights, but also endorses societal codes and norms. That is why they are called ')udges," and 
their job is to define that vague notion of justice. 
VIII. Is Promise Rich Enough? 
In sum, two approaches emerge. Clearly there are several principles at work in contract 
law, and explanation of the vastness, complexity and origin of contract law cannot fully be 
encompassed by any single ethical principle. However, there is a relevant question: Are these 
different principles, or secondary principles, apart from the primary principle of promise, or are 
they built into the language and core of promise? If the former, then one subscribes to a sort of 
ethical toolbox approach, where one simply applies the ethical ideal needed in order to justly 
appraise a situation. If the latter, then perhaps this is case for virtue ethics, which is to say that 
the ethical person and the ethical principal are indivisible linked. 
No, promise alone is not rich enough. But can promise ever be alone? Throughout this 
examination it has been impossible, or at least impractical, to speak of promise without the 
promisor and the promisee incurring an obligation to be "reasonable" or "prudent" or 
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"responsible." This was the case in both the ethical discussion and in the language of the law. 
What one might conclude from this is that, in fact, these principles are inseparable, and the entire 
debate is in some way artificial. Even Corbin, who wrote ten volumes determining distinctions in 
contract law, admits that all human classifications are in someway "wavering and blurred." The 
close interplay of all these principles in contract law seems to constantly hint that these 
classifications, though pragmatically necessitated, become artificial on close inspection. This 
should not be taken as a drastic and deep criticism of all law. Rather, it is an affirmation of the 
interconnectedness that defines the nature of ethics. This nature is the very crux, which law tries 
to apply to our own interrelation and interaction as members of the human race. 
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Faust, Mephistopheles, Order and the Language of Promise: An Essay 
Humpty Dumpty sat upon a wall. 
Humpty Dumpty had a great full. 
All the king's horses and all the king's men 
Could not put Humpty together again. 
From childhood the metaphor of trying to piece together a puzzle that wa" once whole 
and is now broken plays a central role in our psyches. Some children may choose to examine the 
particulars very closely by drawing distinctions, and thereby trying to learn the truth of the origin 
and place of each piece. Others may try and imagine a blueprint of the original and then attempt 
to establish this model as a means to recovering what was lost. Others still may remain quiescent, 
accepting both as manifestations of the same thing. For them, there is little diffen::nce between 
the particular and the ideal. Rather, they smile instead at the marvel of the verse. 
As children of the modem, we are the ones who often embrace the particular over the 
general, the practical above the principle, and the empirical instead of the theoretical. We argue 
that this is a will towards that which is "secure" in place of that seeming metaphysical "spectacle" 
of speculation and ungrounded faith in former times by other children. We reach to be the "good 
empiricists," people who are rational, reasonable, concrete, critical, prudent, and even-minded 
This is the scientific attempt at truth. But where does the sentiment lie? Where is the Hegelian 
synthesis of this thesis, the pieces, and antithesis, the blueprint? Surely the same rational and 
prudent intellect will realize that the particulars, the pieces, are without number, and thus 
unmanageable for the human mind. An order, in spite of its artificiality, must surface. Or else 
humanity is left with an infinite and unconnected chaos! There are still those, like Nietzsche, 
who would argue that a will to a system, any system, is simply a lack of integrity (Nietzsche 93). 
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However apt one is to sympathize with his views, one cannot refute the ever pervasive realm of 
order and irrefutability of the pieces. 
Perhaps the largest piece left for us to define is that of the signification. The tyranny of 
the sign as language invades our existence to our deepest possible consciousness. In fact, it is 
impossible to prove that there is a meta-reality behind the reality oflanguage; for, in order to do 
so, one is trapped in that very language. As pointed out by philosophers like Merleau-Ponty, 
language resembles a perfect map expanding over the exact area that is supposedly represented. 
Thus, there is no way to tell if the land that the map is signifying is really there at all (Merleau-
Ponty 42). Yet one is left with such a strong "gut" intuition as if simply by intestinal fortitude one 
forces that mythical land of one-to-one correspondence into existence. Any other alternative is 
literally unthinkable, or at least, inexpressible. 
There exists therefore an intense relationship of trust between all humanity and language, 
involuntary, but undeniably necessary. It is a sort of order that must be in the universe for that 
universe to be intelligible. Perhaps, no modern Indo-European language strives as hard as 
German to ensure this precarious clarity, security, and stricture. (Only modern Indo-European 
languages are included because ancient Greek may be even more severe. In fact, for this very 
reason Heideggar said that one could only do philosophy in these two languages.) It is as if 
German itself toils to place order in the universe as a whole, and indeed language may be the only 
thing other than God that is powerful enough to do so! (The question naturally arises on the 
nature of the creator: Did the language make the people or the people make the language?) 
An appeal to linguistic philosophy was alluded to in the last section of this essay. It will 
be the primary focus of the epilogue. Since language is to be emphasized, there needs to be a 
central literary metaphor examined, and that allusion will be the pact between Faust and 
Mephistopheles in Goethe's Faust. Admittedly neither Melden nor Fried nor Atiyah had the idea 
of using this as an example in their corresponding philosophies of promise. However, it is worthy 
of analysis because Goethe, in this work, seeks to question the order of the universe and thus 
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-language through interpersonal human relationships that are governed by promise. If these 
interactions can be sufficiently complicated, it leaves one ",i.th the question that Thomas asked in 
his book American Literary Realism and the Failed Promise ojContract: Can we achieve a social 
balance in contract law without appeal to the sublime or transcendental? Since legal reasoning 
traditionally demands a principled approach to verdicts and proceedings (if nothing else, one 
should normally act in agreement with precedent), one is firmly in the sphere of mind. Where the 
mind is, so shall follow the body of casework and this discussion. 
This is a curious sort of combination ofliterary theory, legal thought, the continental 
philosophic tradition, and analytical philosophy. The aim is a search for commonality, which 
will, in tum, deconstruct the strict delineation that divides various schools of thought. Promise 
itself encompasses all of these schools in that it is a form of societal organization. This social 
organization was indeed revolutionary when it came to power along with, or as a result of, a new 
mercantile class at the end of the Renaissance. For the first time persons of all classes could bind 
themselves to whomever they chose by means of an obligation. It was a new freedom. The 
clearly defined roles of serf and lord, nobleman and peasant, were now completely open to 
interpretation. The underpinnings, as well as the duties and obligations of that hierarchical 
society, were severely subverted. The society was now dynamic rather than static, and the self-
reliant and autonomous individual was free to develop fully. 
Accompanied with this new liberty is a need of another definition of self. Questions of 
identity plague the mind whenever such change occurs. Faust is deeply rooted in such a 
questioning. Faust's dealing with Mephistopheles can be seen as the application of this new 
freedom of self and society into a formerly strict dichotomy of heaven and hell. For now Satan's 
domain enters into the psychological. Some scholars have argued that this dichotomy between 
Faust and Mephistopheles is really a battle between Faust's conscience and sub-conscience. In 
the times of the rising individual, the individual becomes a spiritual battleground, both externally 
and internally: according to Freud the Id versus the Ego. Of course, the psychological and sub-
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conscience are common trends and currents associated with romanticism. However, what makes 
Faust different from Wordsworth, B)TOn, or Shelley, or Arnold is, for example, the impossibility 
to revert: there is no re-justification of the universe, nor salvation through an ordered vehicle, 
such as the female, interpersonal love, or nature. Faust finds salvation, but Goethe still leaves one 
very much on Arnold's "darkling plain" by which there seems to be no escape from 
meaninglessness and abstract language. It is a problemization of eternal justice. This principle of 
justice becomes the primary, ideal thrust of law that then produces an enigma and, 
simultaneously, demands thought on such legal issues as contract. 1 
The dilemma of Job becomes the psychological and philosophical metaphor that 
structures the tragedy of Faust. However, Job's redemption occurred by faith and trust in Jaweh. 
This passivity and waiting upon God is no where to be found in the character of Faust. Faust is 
the free individual of this new age, fervently chasing and daring enough to seek the order of it all. 
He is undeniably brave; but, destined to be only a tortured soul, he is ensnared by a sustained 
belief in co-existence of eternal justice and his own fate of sal vation, both of which the Lord 
affirms in the prologue. The classical "going through hell to get to heaven" metaphor as 
exemplified by such characters as Aeneas, Odysseus, and Dante presents itself in Faust. Faust 
explores hell and heaven and the creatures that reside therein, but the demonic and angelic remain 
partially bound as part of the earthly or at least the psychological. Sartre may have said that "hell 
is other people," but for Dr. Faust hell seems to be too much in the dark recesses of himself. 
However, the fundamental difference between Faust's experience and, for example, that of Dante 
is that Dante finds hell and heaven to be eA1remely well organized. This order implies a certain 
justice in the universe. The single line "In His will is our peace" suffices. However, Goethe 
writes a much different setting. His tour of the cosmos is one that is loosely fitted together and 
would seem to the reader under a constant threat of collapse and chaos. The single thread 
1 The same question of justice here is the most powerful motive behind an attempt to order by or through 
abstraction as seen in the extreme organization of Dante or Milton. 
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throughout this work is that of Faust's salvation. The restitution he would owe ifhe were to 
break his deal with the Devil is the only absolute personal driving forces; the contract is the 
constant. This casts Faust into a man who holds on only for the hope, or promise, of a higher 
pleasure at a later time, thereby selling his present right to a normal, earthly tranquility in the 
moment for a chance at a divine consciousness. 
The exact circumstance, embodiment, and language of the contract are central issues 
here. Mephistopheles offers Faust a sort of indentured servitude by which Mephistopheles will 
placate Faust's depression by the fullest pleasures imaginable on this earth. (Such an end is, of 
course, impossible; for if Faust stays true to character, he will only be satisfied by a divine 
consciousness.) The bargain is clear and absolute: If Faust ever says to a moment of time 
"Verweile doch! Du bis! so schon!" [Don't go! You are so beautiful!], Faust will forfeit his life 
and become Mephistopheles's servant in the great hereafter (MacIntyre 117). The features of 
offer, bargain, and acceptance have therefore been duly satisfied. Though they shake hands, thus 
signifying a bilateral acceptance of the terms of contract, Goethe, for poetic and conventional 
purposes, determines the contract as one written in Faust's own blood. It is now recognizable as 
a full-fledged promise, entrusted with all the steadfast, moral obligations and responsibilities that 
are therein contained. Could this apply to Fried's understanding of the liberal ideal or to Melden 
full-blooded paradigm of promise? Neither could deny that the pact fulfills the basic elements of 
contract law: mutual agreement, competent parties, and consideration. l For Fried ,md Melden 
there are two questions: if one could call either of these individuals responsible agents? Is the 
contract's content moral? 
Goethe seems to answer affirmatively. In fact, this is quite an interesting aspect of the 
whole work. The character of Mephistopheles claims a certain amount of trust from both the 
I See page 25 of the main essay for details of each. 
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reader and Faust, and in the Prologue, God's purpose for Mephistopheles is one that is common 
with the development of Faust as a person. 
Des Menschen Taetigkeit kann allzuleicht erschajfon. 
Er liebt sich bald die unbedingte Ruh; 
Drum geb ' ich gem ihm den Gesellen zu, 
Der reizt und wirkt und muss als Teufel schafJen. 
[Mankind's activity can languish all too easily, 
A man soon loves unhampered rest; 
Hence, gladly I give him a comrade such as you, 
Who stirs and works and must, as devil, do] (MacIntyre 12). 
There is indeed a common purpose in the relations between Faust and Mephistopheles. Their 
conversations are always transparent, similar to those between two persons who hold each other 
as part of their moral communities. This is not to say that Faust does not accuse Mephistopheles 
of wrongdoing or evil motives: extensions of evil are more errors of misjudgment and false 
pretence. It is as ifboth proceed from the same quest: the questioning of ultimate justice in the 
universe, which is as much for Mephistopheles's benefit as for Faust's profit. 
The relationship between Mephistopheles and Faust is that of a discourse m modern 
economy. The entire relationship is one of risk-allocation of the most eternal kind, or for the 
most eternal questioning of justice. There is commonality in the project, yet also an inherent 
distrust of the other party as a result of the individuals searching for their own gain. The 
importance of the economic aspects of Faust cannot be understated. In fact, the upheaval of the 
traditional model that Satan is never to be trusted recurs, and it demonstrates that contract must 
have the highest degree of mobility despite previously defined roles. Nebulous and fluid, it 
transcends the categories of good and evil. This role of contract as a new form of societal 
organization is an attempt to "think in fields and functions instead oftl)ing to locate ourselves in 
any fixed system of coordinates" (Burkhardt 5). Such a mobility and fierce individualism are 
possible only in the advent of the modern economy. In essence, the human will, in its contract 
with the transcendental, is trying to actualize within itself a sublime and, in fact, a divine essence 
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through contract. The Faustian yearning is that of translatability and interchangeability between 
the temporal and the eternal. Faust, and to a lesser degree Mephistopheles, searches for that 
single moment in time that can be eternally retained and enjoyed. It is a hunger to transmigrate 
through the transitory into immortality. Faust, as the embodiment of humanity, wants to eat once 
more of the tree oflife, without losing the understanding gained by eating of the tree of 
knowledge. He wants a return to paradise under his own authority and under his mles. Perhaps 
this explains why Mephistopheles's willingness to help, for this is essentially Satan's own quest. 
According to Brinswagner, there are three possible means for man to master time: 
science, art, and economy. Through human action each of these has the ability to become 
timeless. Science seeks to find principles of cause and effect, which can be established as 
independent of their particulars through eternity. Art creates images from the ephemeral matter 
of experience in the moment; however there is a separate reality and truth to that moment which 
transcends that single point of time and becomes timeless. Economy can transfonn all other 
materials into a value, or capital, which is consumed, but never disappears and thus can be carried 
over into the future. (84-85) All of these hinge upon the human ability to act. For this reason 
Faust tries to change the beginning of St. John with "1m Anfang war die Tati" [In the beginning 
was the Deed) and not "1m Arifimg war das Wort" [In the beginning was the Word) (McInt}Te 
81). He is trying to replace the biblical ideal of God, or the Good, from language to action. This 
is archetypal of the human conception of power, as such colloquialisms as "actions speak louder 
than words" or "talk is cheap" typify. It is an attempt to converge the timeless or the word, into 
something that is temporal or the deed. Several of the great Greek and, correspondingly, 
Christian philosophers conceived of God as the Prime Mover, the great mover unmoved, not as 
the Prime Speaker. However, the gospel according to St. John implies that God is in the realm of 
language, something beyond time or human control. God's word, or logos, is so internally 
ordered as not to be transmutable. 
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In the modem view of value as economy, Faust seeks a capital that he can change into 
immortal, eternal, divine, bliss. He is, of course, doomed to fail, and this raises more questions 
than it answers. Job's serenity and acquiescence enable him to succeed, but Faust's bravery never 
knows such relief. Faust is the manifestation of that great human spirit, which, at its best, 
launches men to the moon, but, at its roots, will be eternally a rebellion against God and a 
constant reminder of the failure of the tower of Babel. Faust proceeds by his own rules, the 
contract, and seeks to make the universe succumb to his own understanding. Through Faust, 
Goethe succeeds, in context of the modem spirit and economy, in seriously questioning, ifnot 
problematizing completely, the eternal order or justice of the universe, as well as lhe human 
condition and all systems of order, which includes language itself. By controlling the apparently 
strict dichotomies of opposing spirits, which resembles the Hegelian mode of thesis and 
antithesis, Faust draws the opposition between conscience and the sub-conscience" pain and 
pleasure, good and evil, Faust and Mephistopheles, Apollo and Dionysus, Static and Dynamic, 
momentary and transcendental, and freedom and fate: in sum, the pieces of Humpty Dumpty 
contend with the blueprint of Humpty Dumpty. Although one is left in a world of diametric 
opposition and human torment, there is indeed a commonality. The Hegelian term "synthesis" is 
not quite correct, for that would imply that the former duality was a discourse of war, which 
contradicts the communal spirit of Faust. 
lch bin ein Tei! des Tei/s, des anfangs alles war. 
Ein Teil der Finsternis. die sich das Licht gebar. 
Das stolze Licht. das nun der Mutter Nacht, 
Und doch gelingt 's ihm nicht, da es, soviel es strebt, 
Verkauftet und den Koerpern klebl. 
[But I'm part of the Part which at the first was all, 
Part of the Darkness that gave birth to Light, 
The haughty Light that now with Mother Night 
Disputes her ancient rank and space withal, 
And yet 'twill not succeed, since, strive as strive it may, 
Fettered to bodies will Light stay] (McIntyre 91). 
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Goethe points to a universal and thus human interconnectedness. The previous dichotomies and 
distinctions are always and necessarily false. As has been seen, Mephistopheles is a part of Faust 
as involuntarily as it may be. Indeed, the fragments of the shell left by Humpty Dumpty may 
appear to have distinct divisions between them, but those borders should not be the focus. They 
resulted from the fall, not the plan of the divine or the sublime, and are most definitely not part of 
mankind's search to find purpose. There is no absolute, no transcendental, no one-to-one 
correspondence betw-een the sign and meaning. In sum, there is no perfect foundation on this 
earth. The will towards such a will of a perfect foundation is the lack of integrity that Nietzsche 
was addressing. 
Faust is saved, but it is a painful salvation. Much like Ivan in Dostoyevski's The 
Brothers Karamazov, Faust finds neither serenity nor tranquility in this life. However, we 
simultaneously applaud his tenacity and will, for it is tenacity that enables humanity to ascend 
and leave footsteps on lunar bodies. Faust is justified in his disgust of the common ways of 
thinking and learning. Indeed his vision was ultimately expanded. Similarly, he risks all for his 
own form of freedom and creativity like Stephen Dedalus' decision to reject becoming apart of 
the clergy in Joyce's Portrait of the Artist. Faust's insatiability is at the same time his saving 
grace and fatal flaw. He pits his will for understanding against the normal precedent of the 
masses in the hope that he will find a transforming truth. Ifhe is wrong, Faust risks being lost for 
eternity, but a longing for individuation compels him. His engages in the human process of 
"Becoming," and that development is not always pleasant and rewarding. The responsibility to 
create one's own values is sometimes accompanied by the pain that follows failure. The ability to 
choose does not mean that all decisions are correct. It is the spirit of Fried's liberal ideal where 
the language is allowed to govern the future. 
Language, signification and embodiment are large pieces of the puzzle that comprise the 
system in which we have no choice to live. However, appeals to statements like "loquor, ergo 
est" by Burkhardt are yet another chapter in the saga of Western thought which attempts to find 
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that single absolute grounding upon which one can build and extend with assurance (15). In 
Faust. language and meaning are sufficiently problematized, not just in the hope of actualizing a 
one-to-one correspondence, but in the quest to derive a principle of human experience. 
Consequently, the search for order and justice in this world seems to be an impossible goal. Faust 
is in chaos because of the enormous upheaval of what was formerly thought to be the absolute 
blueprint. The transcendence of the former system is now bankrupt: and there was a new search 
for the sublime in reason, economy, and the demigod of intense individual freedom that becomes 
the nature of contract. All of these will prove to be unstable at some point in the future just as all 
of their predecessors were. Salvation is in anything except tate, and an absolute foundation is 
anything but just. Language and its embodiment in human existence are similarly transitory, but 
are trustworthy to degree as the points of departure for understanding human commonality. They 
are indeed the system of the sign without need of foundation or ability to find foundation 2 
The state of humanity appears to be a neutrality in that one can realize this obscurity in 
meaning, but one cannot refute the systems of body and language by which that ideal was 
formed. 3 Embodiment and the speech-act deconstruct that former duality between particular and 
abstraction, and they become the singular, the demarcation of a monolith unto themselves. 
Reality is then actualized in the particulars: the itch of poison ivy, the tension between the sexes, 
the relief of urination, the warm quiver of mother's voice, the peculiarity of mood when reflecting 
on child hood. On the other hand, reality is then actualized in the abstract: our biological 
functionality, a soulful emptiness, the dissonant melody of Miles Davis, the moment of bliss at 
the first whiff of apple blossoms, the demanding of meaning on our orgasms, a will to achieve the 
next level, the insatiable human appetite--- all of which collide into a murky harmony that 
compels one to accept the universe as a whole. It is the distinction that makes the system 
artificial; the delineation that disturbs and ultimately disrupts the prospect of universal justice. 
2 Consider Thomas's question if social balance in contract law can be found without appeals to the sublime. 
3 Consider Dante's "In His will is our peace." 
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The failure of the Enlightenment taught us that Faust's suffering and evil can never be explained 
by such systems of definition or representation. "All of the king's horses and of the king's men" 
(human, earthly power) will never return us to our paradise lost. 
11 
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